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OSSIS AND WESSIS: 




Perhaps the biggest surprise during the 
post-communist era has been the protracted 
integration of the Eastern Lander into former 
West Germany. Perhaps less surprising, but 
more serious, have been the difficulties arising 
from the integration of the two cultures. The 
resulting differences in attitudes and opinions 
have led to some expected complications, such 
as the inability of many East Germans to adjust 
to the capitalist system. They have also led to 
more insidious problems, such as a reluctance 
to cooperate due to mutual prejudice. German 
observers have frequently documented this as 
the conflict between the so-called Ossis (East 
Germans) and Wessis (West Germans). 
(Fulbrook, p. 211; Le Gloannec, p.129; Burke, 
p. 1; "Divided Still," p. 3) The perceived differ-
ences have manifested themselves in denigra-
tory jokes which often depict the Wessis as arro-
gant and the Ossis as lazy. (Winkler, p. 107) 
Although these prejudices may be distortions 
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of the truth, they underlie the actual causes of 
conflict - the West German misconceptions 
about the East and the East German notion of 
government support. 
The practical importance of this issue stems 
not only from the fact that these differences 
affect everyday business throughout Germany, 
but also from the fact that they have had an influ-
ence on political decisions. This article will 
attempt to explain exactly how the German psy-
che and the German economy are linked. The 
first half will examine how the differing attitudes 
of Eastern and Western Germans have hindered 
the rapid integration of the Eastern Lander. The 
second half will go on to explain some of 
Germany's more questionable economic deci-
sions from a sociological perspective. 
To understand the implications of current 
economic events within the context of these social 
problems, background knowledge of their recent 
cultural history is required. Therefore, we will 
first focus on the directions in which the cultures 
of these two nations headed after World War II. 
Historical Formation of Ossis and 
Wessis 
Die Wessis 
The story of West Germany after WWII was 
the story of a nation groping for reconciliation 
with its past. Ironically, at a time when it was 
forming a new national identity, most West 
Germans were rejecting their German heritage. 
Instead, post -nationalism and cosmopolitanism 
were the norm, and many West Germans were 
claiming to be not German but rather European. 
Consequently, several famed German intellectu-
als found it convenient to take up permanent res-
idency with their European neighbors. Most 
notable were Huns-Magnus Enzensberger and 
Peter Schneider who moved to Italy, and Lothar 
Baier who moved to France. (Le Gloannec, p. 129) 
The result of West Germany's uneasy acceptance 
of nationhood was a businesslike democratic 
republic devoid of flag-waving or national cele-
brations. (Le Gloannec, p. 129) 
A later solution to West Germany's iden-
tity crisis was pride in the economy, or 
"deutsche mark nationalism." (Fulbrook, p. 
211) With the economic miracle of the 1950s, 
West Germans finally had something to be 
proud of. Indeed, the credit given to the West 
German government formed the foundation for 
its support. Otherwise the FOR may have suf-
fered the same fate as its democratic predeces-
sor, the Weimar Republic. Even today, the 
deutsche mark is as much of a symbol of 
German national identity as the German flag. 
A major issue in the early days of the Federal 
Republic was its claim to be the true successor to 
the Reich. With the introduction of democracy, 
it was obvious that the new government was a 
break with the past. Its claim to be the sole legit-
imate power in all of Germany could only be jus-
tifiable so long as reunification was still possible. 
Even its constitution stated that "the entire 
German people are called upon to achieve in free 
self-determination the unity and freedom of 
Germany." ("Divided Still," p. 3) 
Die Ossis 
The East German government had no 
such problem. The majority of East German 
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leaders had been dissidents during the Nazi 
regime. They were therefore able to brush aside 
any responsibility for World War II. Although 
their claims to be "the better Germany" were 
predicated upon their more complete break 
with the Nazi past, theirs was a break from fas-
cism, not nationalism. In fact, much was done 
on the part of the East German government to 
foster a national identity. It promoted long-held 
German traditions, German historical figures 
like Frederick the Great, and other government 
propaganda. In effect, East Germany was a con-
tinuation of what had been in place prior to 
Nazi Germany, not so much on the basis of its 
political system, but on the basis of cultural 
continuity. Indeed, many observers considered 
East Germany to be "the more German" of the 
two. (Le Gloannec, p. 129) 
Also in contrast to West Germans, East 
Germans did not regard the existence of gov-
ernment as a formality- it was their liveli-
hood. By the very nature of communism they 
were forced into a close relationship with their 
government. The government provided food, 
clothing, jobs, education, and training. Choice 
became something of an illusion, as most of 
their major life decisions were made for them. 
Often, successful careers were dictated less by 
talent and effort than they were by political con-
formity. Although the East German standard 
of living could not compare to that of the West, 
East Germans were free from the fear of failure; 
they needed only to follow instructions to real-
ize a mediocre existence. 
Sociological Contributions to Poor 
Economic Performance 
Opposing Mindsets 
These were the stories of East Germany 
and West Germany before 1989. Since then, 
"deutsche mark nationalism" and communism 
have been replaced by colonialism and vas-
salage. Such was the result of the experiment 
known as German reunification. Even without 
recounting the numerous complications which 
have arisen since then, one could anticipate the 
reactions that would take place once the two 
cultures were mixed together. On one side of 
the Berlin Wall is a country which spent 40 
years as capitalism's front line against commu-
nism. On the other side is a people who have 
relied upon the government to solve their prob-
lems. To say, then, that the integration of the 
Eastern Lander into the FRG has resembled a 
colonist acquisition more than a mutual reuni-
fication should come as no surprise. 
Many of the current economic problems 
in the Eastern Lander can be traced to West 
Germany's colonialist approach to reunifica-
tion. Maternity leave, child care, education, and 
health care are just a few of the thriving pro-
grams that were disregarded by the West 
German government. (Fulbrook, p. 211) 
Reunification could have been a great learning 
experience, combining the best systems from 
both sides, but instead it resulted in the whole-
sale imposition of the West German system on 
East Germany. Many East Germans consider 
this the result of arrogance and blind anti-com-
munist prejudice on the part of the West. Such 
a response is understandable considering that 
West Germany had been waging war, so to 
speak, against communism for the past 40 
years. Having won the war of ideologies, West 
Germany had earned the right to dictate the 
terms of surrender. On the other hand, it would 
be wrong to think that East Germans were 
being integrated into the western system 
against their will; they had precisely such expec-
tations from the beginning. West Germany was 
merely responding to those expectations. That 
cries against colonization can now be heard is 
more the result of disappointment with regard 
to integration. 
From the other perspective , West 
Germans criticize the Ossis for complaining too 
much. They see such criticism as ungrateful, 
particularly in light of the sacrifices they made 
to support the East Germans. Although East 
Germans truly have a lot to complain about, 
one has to wonder how they could ask for more 
assistance after they have already received near-
ly DM 1 trillion. A lifetime of communism has 
no doubt developed a "handout mentality" in 
the East. It cannot be overstated that the gov-
ernment took care of everything during the 
CDR regime. One was paid whether one 
worked or not. Indeed, the largest obstacle 
impeding economic recovery is this notion of 
government support. Many East Germans 
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blame the government when things go wrong. 
If their standard of living is low, it is not because 
the workers are unproductive; it is because the 
government is not providing enough jobs or 
high enough salaries. Before East Germans can 
compete successfully on the open market, even 
before they adjust to the capitalist system, they 
must realize that a higher standard of living can 
only be achieved through hard work. 
Current Status of Reunification 
Just prior to reunification, West Germans 
enjoyed a level of material prosperity, financial 
stability, and social security unmatched in 
Europe. So great was their economic power that 
they virtually dictated the Maastrict criteria for 
European monetary union. Who would have 
imagined that they would be struggling to meet 
these same criteria less than five years later? 
Besides raising the national debt to four 
per cent of GDP, the subsidization of German 
reunification has led to the worst German 
recession since 1982. (Mayer, p. 1) Currently, 
unemployment is at 12 percent and has risen 
to a staggering 25 percent in some parts of 
Eastern Germany. Even after seven years, the 
Eastern Lander produce only 60 percent of 
what they consume. With the collapse of east-
ern markets, rapidly rising wage costs, and the 
resulting lack of investment, the end to this 
recession appears nowhere in sight. 
Particularly hard hit by the recession have 
been East German males in their 40s and 50s 
and women of all ages. The fact that these 
groups have resigned themselves to leave the 
work force has caused the labor force partici-
pation rate in the Eastern Lander to fall from 
95 percent to 60 percent while causing an over-
all unemployment rate of only 17 percent. For 
older workers, their inability to adapt to the new 
economic environment has been the main 
source of their troubles. At the beginning of 
reunification, East German workers were given 
three choices: migrate to the West, be retrained 
by the government, or retire early. Of the 
600,000 East Germans who migrated to the 
West in 1990, few were older than 30. Most 
older workers took their chances by remaining 
in the East. Those who opted for government 
retraining found that they were rarely hired 
afterwards. Thus the majority of men in their 
40s and 50s, neither able nor willing to adjust 
to the new system, simply chose to enter into 
early retirement. This influx of new social 
dependents placed an even greater burden upon 
the government. (Karpac, p. 80) 
In contrast, most women who lost their 
jobs after reunification remained unemployed 
despite their efforts. Under the old system, 90 
percent of all women belonged to the work 
force. (Hagenbuch, p. 54) Not only did they 
contribute to the East German economy in 
terms of numbers, but they had also enjoyed a 
level of equality with men in education, train-
ing, and career opportunities to a degree never 
realized in the West. (Fulbrook, p. 211) They 
made up 49 percent of those in vocational train-
ing, they comprised 51 percent of the work 
force, and 90 percent of them held either voca-
tional or college degrees. (Hagenbuch, 
p. 55) In fact, the CDR had the highest female 
literacy rate in the world as recently as 1991. 
(Goldberg, p. 35) Today, however, they account 
for 65 percent of Germany's unemployed and 
are only hired for one in four new jobs. 
(Hagenbuch, p. 54) 
Great Expectations 
In the early days of reunification, 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl had promised "flour-
ishing landscapes" in the East within just a few 
years. ("Divided Still," p. 3) Never did he imag-
ine that those words would still haunt him a 
decade later. Chancellor Kohl had many rea-
sons to believe that he could fulfill his promise. 
At the time, East Germany was considered to 
be one of the world's ten strongest economies. 
Its production levels were reportedly 50 percent 
of West German levels, and its industrial base 
was the class of Eastern Europe. ("The 
Reconstruction of Eastern Germany," 1996) It 
had all the ingredients for recovery, and reuni-
fication euphoria besides. 
Ironically, Kohl, and indeed all of West 
Germany, had been victimized by communist 
propaganda. East Germany was not one of the 
world's top ten economies; instead it suffered 
from a dilapidated infrastructure, a polluted envi-
ronment, an exodus of skilled labor, and a low 
set of qualification and performance standards. 
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That production was really just 30 percent of 
West German levels was the least of its problems. 
Perhaps more misleading than the false 
reports was the belief that East Germany's 
recovery would mimic the economic miracle of 
the 1950s. Although most West Germans 
acknowledged what an achievement it was, it 
provided the only experience with which they 
could base their expectations. Their other rea-
son for expecting a miracle was East Germany's 
unique advantage- it had a big brother in the 
West. Currently, Eastern Germany enjoys fed-
eral subsidies totalling 40 percent of its GDP. 
West Germany, in comparison, had received 
only 2 percent of its GDP from the Marshall 
plan. In an era marked by the ultra-rapid indus-
trialization of East Asia, West Germans had no 
reason to think that it would take a miracle to 
revitalize the Eastern Lander. 
While West Germans may see many simi-
larities between the Ossis of today and the 
Wessis of 40 years ago, the two situations could 
hardly be more different. West Germans had 
the benefit of competitive wages and an under-
valued currency, but East Germans suffered 
from elevated wages and an inflated currency. 
West Germans started from nothing. East 
Germans started from less than nothing - not 
only did they have to rebuild their environment 
and infrastructure from the ground up, but they 
also had to repair the damages incurred from 
forty years of neglect. A further difference 
between the two is that West Germans were 
accustomed to rebuilding; they had done the 
same thing after WWI. East Germans, in con-
trast, had no experience with rebuilding, nor 
were they mentally equipped for the change and 
instability associated with it. 
Politically Motivated Economic 
Decisions 
The 1:1 Exchange Rate 
As shown in the previous section, socio-
logical factors are largely responsible for the 
lack of cooperation between the Ossis and 
Wessis. Equally important has been their neg-
ative influence on economic decisions. Indeed, 
three of Germany's most damaging policies 
since reunification have been politically moti-
vated. The first of these was the generous 
exchange of ost marks for deutsche marks. Set 
at 2:1 for financial assets and liabilities, a 1:1 
exchange rate was available for up to 2,000 ost 
marks for those under fourteen years old, up to 
4,000 ost marks for those between fourteen and 
fifty-eight, and up to 6,000 ost marks for those 
over fifty-eight. 
Although the exchange rate was initially 
advantageous to East Germans, they quickly 
learned that while wealth grew in value in the 
East, so did debt. This was most noticeable in 
the sale of East German businesses by 
Treuhand, the government agency created to 
manage the privatization of Eastern Germany. 
A company which might have cost it millions 
of ost marks to shut down before the exchange 
now cost it millions of deutsche marks. A sec-
ond, more damaging, effect of the exchange rate 
was that East German goods became overpriced 
and uncompetitive. Its main export market, 
central Europe, was now lost. The third effect 
of the exchange rate was to allow pent-up 
Eastern demand to drive up prices on most con-
sumer goods. The resulting inflation decreased 
investment in Germany and slowed growth. 
Mterwards, East Germans were back where they 
started; only now they had to face West German 
prices with East German salaries. The 1:1 
exchange rate therefore increased the cost of 
living instead of raising the standard of living. 
Germany had several practical reasons for 
wanting to unify its currency so quickly. Most 
important among these was to lower transfer 
costs from East to West. However, the symbol-
ic significance of monetary union should not 
be underestimated. The deutsche mark for 
West Germany was what it meant to be 
German. Lacking historical pride or national-
ism, the deutsche mark was the one thing that 
prevented West Germans from simply being 
"European." Accordingly, East Germans could 
not be truly integrated into the republic unless 
they too used the deutsche mark. A 6:1 
exchange rate would have been an equal trade, 
but the 1:1 exchange rate was a gift. It was a 
gesture intended to ingratiate the East Germans 
towards Kohl's Christian Democratic Party. 
Instead, its symbolic value was probably never 
grasped in the East, and its long-term effects 
only fueled further alienation. 
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Wage Parity 
The second politically motivated decision 
in question arose partly from the standard-of-
living disparity just mentioned. Instead of wait-
ing for market influences to improve East 
German salaries, the government decided to 
mandate wage parity between East and West. 
Increasing wages faster than productivity gains, 
the government effectively priced East German 
labor out of the low-skill manufacturing mar-
ket they needed. 
Initially, the move was motivated by fears 
that East Germans would migrate westward to 
look for higher paying work. Not only would 
this further deplete skilled labor in this region, 
but it would also increase the competition for 
jobs in an already strained western job market. 
Perhaps more importantly, many West 
Germans frustrated by the reunification process 
felt just as uneasy about living side-by-side with 
East Germans as they did about competing with 
them for jobs. 
The willingness of the government to per-
form acts of kindness, even against its better judg-
ment, is known in German politics as moralpoli-
tik. (Martes, p. 1) Moralpolitik also played a role 
in the government's decision to mandate wage 
parity between East and West. Realizing that it 
had just raised the cost of living, the government 
felt it necessary to prevent the standard of living 
in the East from actually falling. As a member of 
the powerful metalworkers' union, IG Metall 
argued, Eastern pay might be up to 70 percent of 
Western levels, "but a yogurt costs the same 
wherever you buy it. You can't let people starve." 
("A Bottomless Pit?" p. 6) 
Privatization 
The third major economic policy to be 
politically tainted was the privatization process. 
To accommodate Eastern interests, Treuhand 
wanted to maintain as many existing jobs in the 
Eastern Lander as possible. To accommodate 
Western interests, it was receptive to 
Westerners' claims to confiscated properties in 
the East. By neither did it do what was in the 
interests of the economy. 
The effect of sustaining Eastern jobs was to 
put a greater tax burden on the West. Many 
Eastern industries were obsolete, so it was more 
expensive to keep them in operation than it would 
have been to shut them down and pay unem-
ployment compensation. Consider the examples 
of MTW and Volkswerft. The two shipyards were 
handed over to Bremer Vulcan in 1992 along with 
DM 2.5 million in subsidies. Recognizing the 
futility of the venture, Bremer Vulcan made no 
efforts to revive the shipyards; they used the funds 
to improve their Western operations instead. The 
German government, after learning of the mis-
appropriation, decided to regain controlling inter-
est of the two companies. The expected cost of 
reprivatization is now an additional DM 1 billion. 
("Division of Labor," p. 12) 
The economic situation in the Eastern 
Lander was also damaged by Treuhand's policy 
of honoring land titles held before WWII. By 
seriously considering West German claims to 
confiscated property in the East, Treuhand cre-
ated confusion concerning property ownership. 
As a result, many outside interests were dis-
suaded from making investments there. Eastern 
German companies were especially hurt by this 
situation, for the uncertainty about their land 
ownership made it nearly impossible to use their 
property as collateral for obtaining loans. 
Sociological Consequences of 
Reunification 
The effect of the prolonged recovery has 
been disillusionment for both sides. The reac-
tion of the West has been characterized by a loss 
of faith in their sociopolitical system, while 
those in the East have almost become nostal-
gic towards the former communist system. The 
common reaction of both is to blame the other 
side for their problems. 
Though much can be said about the plight 
of the Ossis , one cannot help but be sympa-
thetic towards the Wessis. Once members of 
one of the strongest economies in the world, 
they must now contend with high unemploy-
ment, slow economic growth, a rising national 
debt, and, perhaps most disconcerting, ingrat-
itude from the East. So much of their nation-
al identity is tied to pride in their economy that 
wavering belief in their sociopolitical system is 
not surprising. Now even European monetary 
union is in jeopardy, and many West Germans 
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are reexamining their basic assumptions about 
government and economics. 
The rationale for blame in the West is that 
the economy was doing well before West 
Germans took on the burden of supporting the 
East. They cite their many sacrifices for the East, 
the most important of which have come direct-
ly from their own tax money. What they have 
tended to ignore, however, was the growing 
unemployment, slower rate of economic growth, 
aging population, rise in industrial disputes, and 
increasing voter dissatisfaction that were all pre-
sent even before reunification. (Fulbrook, p. 211) 
They have also tended to ignore the fact that 
reunification did not have to be a charitable oper-
ation; that it turned out to be so is the result of 
squandered opportunities and not the inherent 
inferiority of East Germany. For instance, low 
labor costs in the East combined with high 
growth rates could actually have been a boon to 
the West German economy. Modern manufac-
turing plants such as the one built by Opel in 
Eisenach and the ones built by Volkswagon in 
Mosel and Chemnitz exemplify the potential of 
developing the Eastern region. Despite claims 
of East German laziness, these plants are among 
the most competitive in the world. ("Division of 
Labor," p. 12) 
Blame in the East for the slow recovery 
arises from the ingrained dependence of many 
Eastern Germans on the government. Even 
after all the help they have received, many still 
feel that the government could be doing more. 
Such claims naturally originate from compar-
isons with their former government. The fact 
that the current system does not match up to 
their standard of comparison can explain how 
so many Easterners have become nostalgic 
towards their past. Even those who had diffi-
cult lives under the former regime have been 
able to recall positive moments from their past: 
"The very fact that life was hard meant we had 
good human relations. You need a spare part 
for your car so you need friends, you need them 
to survive. Now it's each for himself," said 
Rudolf Rudicke, a retired professor of linguis-
tics at Leipzig University. (Schwarz, p. 29) 
Bettina Loser, a lecturer also at Leipzig 
University, voices opinions held by many in the 
East: "Values are forced on us, money values we 
don't want. We can't stop talking about money 
because the rents have gone through the roof 
and we all fear for our jobs because the Wessis 
come and say we don't know anything, but they 
really just want the jobs." (Schwarz, p. 21) 
Although the effects of political and eco-
nomic changes on the Ossis have been the main 
concern of this article, the complete turnaround 
in culture should not be ignored. Consider how 
great a role the CDR played in the social orga-
nization of East German life. Government func-
tions, parades, ceremonies, and youth organi-
zations formed the basis around which East 
German social life revolved. As Pastor Freidrich 
Schorlemmer states, "Every town had its dance 
groups, circuses, music schools, theaters: every-
one could take part. Now we have seven TV 
channels." (Schwarz, p. 29) 
Statements such as this illustrate a basic 
assumption in the West regarding the superior-
ity of their lifestyle. West German economics, 
politics, and values have been imported whole-
sale into the East without considering the mer-
its of the existing systems. Though in many ways 
the new government was simply responding to 
Eastern expectations, it misinterpreted those 
expectations to mean complete integration when 
the only thing that East Germans truly desired 
was material prosperity. The irony of reunifica-
tion is that the Ossis feel less control now than 
they did under the dictatorship- although 
when they were given orders before, at least the 
orders were coming from countrymen. This sen-
timent has caused the East to accuse the West of 
colonization. Indeed, many in the West react to 
the Ossis like second-class citizens. Those Wesszs 
living in the East have been known to purpose-
ly avoid associating with the Ossis by shopping 
at their own stores, eating at their own restau-
rants, and socializing at their own taverns. 
Bengt Kosterman, the director of the Swedish 
Export Council, notes further that West German 
businessmen take the same attitude toward their 
East German business partners. (Smith, p. 23) 
In addition, Klaus Gysi, a former CDR ambas-
sador, predicts that the East will always remain 
"a second-rate region for workers and peasants, 
like Sicily. There are transitional measures, wel-
fare, artificial jobs for the moment. But in the 
long run nothing: no real production. If we're 
lucky we may learn to be managers of other peo-
ples' companies." (Schwarz, p. 29) 
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Besides having to deal with the present sit-
uation, the Ossis must now learn to reinterpret 
their past. If the past is not the history of class 
struggles against the elite, what is it? They 
must also learn how to deal with the Western 
accounts of the Third Reich and responsibility 
for World War II. Lastly, how are they to inter-
pret the past 40 years? Without doubt the Stasi 
witch-hunt has pitted neighbor against neigh-
bor. Eastern Germans are just now beginning 
to learn the full extent of their surveillance by 
this CDR government agency. Anti-Stasi sus-
picion has been an unfortunate consequence 
for Eastern Germany. At a time when their 
leadership skills are most needed, former gov-
ernment employees have been forced to hide 
those ties or fade to the background. Whether 
or not sentiments in the former CDR allow this 
pool of talent to come forward may indeed dic-
tate the progress of the Eastern Lander. 
Germany's Future 
The possibility which Germany now faces 
is that of having two German nations in one 
German state. Although the two parties may 
be legally and politically joined, their differ-
ences in culture, wages, standards of living, atti-
tudes, and opinions may make them no more 
of a single nation now than they were in 1989. 
Precedent already exists for similar situations. 
Culturally speaking, regions such as Tibet and 
Bavaria have remained noticeably different from 
the rest of their countries for decades. Regions 
such as Mississippi and Sicily have remained 
economic anomalies in their respective coun-
tries for just as long. To say, then, that the mere 
coexistence of these two regions will inevitably 
lead to social harmony would be unjustified. 
There is no reason why their division cannot go 
on indefinitely. 
With respect to a united Germany, even 
modest estimates place its ideological unifica-
tion at a generation or more. The antagonism 
between the two sides may have been fostered 
during the Cold War, but the events of the past 
eight years may have made their discord run 
even deeper. Recall that the Germans had been 
separated initially against their will. Although 
government propaganda may have stated oth-
erwise, East and West Germans never consid-
ered each other to be enemies. Rather, they 
understood the Cold War as a battle between 
capitalism and communism, democracy versus 
autocracy, NATO versus the East Bloc. However, 
now that they have been made to work togeth-
er, East Germans see West Germans as arrogant 
and unsympathetic, and West Germans see East 
Germans as whining and lazy. The difficulties 
resulting from reunification have therefore 
brought out the worst from both sides. 
One has to wonder, then, whether the two 
sides would be so antagonistic had there been a 
smoother transition. Obviously, West Germans 
could not claim that the Ossis were lazy if they 
had enacted a speedy turnaround. East 
Germans likewise could not claim that the 
Wessis were unsympathetic if there were no dif-
ficulties with which to sympathize. What this 
comes down to is "Which came first?" Did the 
economic difficulties aggravate minor differ-
ences in perception, or did the differences in 
perception prevent an efficient outcome? 
Without fear of equivocation, the answer is both. 
Examples such as the productive auto plants in 
the East and moralpolitik in the West show that 
the notion of the Ossis and Wessis may in fact 
be a myth. Denigratory jokes and other symp-
toms of prejudice have seemingly evolved in the 
attempts of Germans to identify the causes of 
their current crisis. Although the differences 
between Ossis and Wessis are real, the present 
situation has not come about as the result of 
arrogance or laziness. It has, however, stemmed 
partly from their differences, and more directly 
from their lack of cooperation. The Wessis have 
had trouble cooperating with the Ossis partly 
because they have confused the East German 
situation with their own situation in the 1950s. 
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The Ossis have had trouble cooperating because 
many do not see cooperation as a part of their 
job. They instead see their economic recovery 
as a one-sided affair, with the government being 
solely responsible for their economic well being. 
Until both sides can overcome their precon-
ceived notions of how reunification should 
work, neither will see the desired outcome. That 
cooperation is central to their future success is 
agreed to by Ulrich Kasparick, head of the 
Magdeburg branch of Freidrich-Ebert Stiftung: 
"Germany may be unable to undertake any sig-
nificant initiative, domestic or foreign, until a 
more unified national consciousness is in place." 
(qtd. in Burke, p.l) 
The question being raised here seems to 
be not "How long will it take?" but "Will it ever 
happen?" The answers to both of these ques-
tions have already been answered by Eastern 
Germany's youth. Having always followed the 
latest in West German fashion and music, the 
younger generation of Eastern Germany is 
already receptive to Western culture and 
lifestyles. For many of them, the past eight 
years have been a time of excitement. Whereas 
the world once consisted of either the East Bloc 
or the inaccessible capitalist West, the youth of 
Eastern Germany now enjoy access to all of 
Europe. More importantly, the range of oppor-
tunities now available is believed by many of 
them to be the greatest thing that has happened 
to them during their lifetimes. Considering 
that this group of open-minded individuals will 
be running the Eastern German economy just 
when the upgrade of their infrastructure is to 
be completed, the true German reunification 
may be less than a generation away. 
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